Objective: Suboptimal decision making in the face of risk (DMR) in children with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) may be mediated by deficits in a number of different neuropsychological processes. We investigated DMR in children with ADHD using the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT) to distinguish difficulties in adjusting to changing probabilities of choice outcomes (so-called risk adjustment) from general risk proneness, and to distinguish these 2 processes from delay aversion (the tendency to choose the least delayed option) and impairments in the ability to reflect on choice options. Based on previous research, we predicted that suboptimal performance on this task in children with ADHD would be primarily relate to problems with risk adjustment and delay aversion rather than general risk proneness. Method: Drug naïve children with ADHD (n ϭ 36), 8 to 12 years, and an age-matched group of typically developing children (n ϭ 34) performed the CGT. Results: As predicted, children with ADHD were not more prone to making risky choices (i.e., risk proneness). However, they had difficulty adjusting to changing risk levels and were more delay aversive-with these 2 effects being correlated. Conclusions: Our findings add to the growing body of evidence that children with ADHD do not favor risk taking per se when performing gambling tasks, but rather may lack the cognitive skills or motivational style to appraise changing patterns of risk effectively.
as a problem into adolescence and adulthood and become associated with reckless driving (Thompson, Molina, Pelham, & Gnagy, 2007) , substance uses or abuses (Rooney, Chronis-Tuscano, & Yoon, 2012) , risky sexual behavior (Sarver, McCart, Sheidow, & Letourneau, 2014) , and pathological gambling (Faregh & Derevensky, 2011; Waluk, Youssef, & Dowling, 2015) -all factors that reduce quality of life (Beitz, Salthouse, & Davis, 2014) . It has been suggested that this tendency reflects deficits in decision making in the face of risk (DMR). Neuropsychologically, DMR is a complex process that requires the integration of external information with internal value systems during choice between response options with differences in outcome probability Ochsner & Gross, 2014) . Gambling paradigms are frequently used to assess DMR (Bechara, 2007; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Deakin, Aitken, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2004) . Thus, impaired DMR could be related to a range of cognitive and motivational factors (Buelow & Suhr, 2009; SonugaBarke, Cortese, Fairchild, & Stringaris, in press) . To understand what particular process drives poor DMR in ADHD, it is important to distinguish these different elements. We hypothesize that the poor DMR may stem from three different dysfunctional processes in ADHD: risk proneness (thrill seeking), reflection impulsivity (poor inhibitory control), or delay aversion (motivational impulsivity).
First, poor DMR could be caused by the attractiveness of risk for children with ADHD (Groen, Gaastra, Lewis-Evans, & Tucha, 2013) . Indeed, individuals with ADHD are often regarded as innate thrill seekers and gamblers. However, in a recent review (Groen et al., 2013) , only half of the 14 studies testing DMR in children with ADHD, using laboratory-based gambling paradigms, showed them to be significantly more risk favoring than typically developing children. The inconsistencies between studies may be explained by their use of different gambling paradigms (Groen et al., 2013) or by different approaches to calculating risk taking tendencies (Buelow & Suhr, 2009 ). In particular, a distinction can be drawn between "explicit" and "implicit" gambling paradigms. This relates to whether the acting outcome probabilities are described to participants or not. For instance, the probability of wins or losses under different trail conditions is learned on a trial and error basis during the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT): Children are unaware of the probabilities of the contingencies when they start performing at the beginning of the task (see Brand, Recknor, Grabenhorst, & Bechara, 2007, for DMR under ambiguity) . The IGT findings to date show that it is only in the second half of this task (when probabilities are more likely to have been learned, but also when their persistence on the task is tested), that children with ADHD display abnormal performance (Garon, Moore, & Waschbusch, 2006; Geurts, van der Oord, & Crone, 2006; Hobson, Scott, & Rubia, 2011; Toplak, Jain, & Tannock, 2005) . This highlights the importance of making information about choice probabilities explicit from the start of the task if one is interested in risk taking per se rather than contingency learning.
However, given the complexity of many risk/gambling situations, children with ADHD may struggle to effectively adjust their choices to take account of information about the probabilities of different outcomes-even when that information is explicit. In this case, individuals with ADHD would not be risk takers per se, but rather generally show impaired decision making on complex tasks. Second, they may therefore make less rational decisions because of an inability to reflect sufficiently carefully on possible outcomes-making rapid choices between different options. This may be due to inhibitory problems (Barkley, 1997) that limit the time available to evaluate outcome options effectively. Both children (Solanto et al., 2007) and adults (Young, Morris, Toone, & Tyson, 2007) with ADHD make decisions more quickly than controls, and these effects persist, even when the level of task difficulty is increased (Young et al., 2007) , on the Tower of London Task that predominantly loads on inhibitory control (Miyake et al., 2000) .
Third, suboptimal DMR may alternatively stem from delay aversion (i.e., the motivation to escape/avoid delay; Sonuga-Barke, 1994 , with their choices being dominated by the immediacy of the outcome rather than its probability. There is now considerable evidence that children with ADHD prefer smaller, immediate rewards (or gratifications) over larger delayed rewards (Marco et al., 2009; Paloyelis, Asherson, Mehta, Faraone, & Kuntsi, 2010; Solanto et al., 2001) . A negative emotional state (unpleasant delay-induced feelings that create an inner tension) mediated by hyperactivation of the brain's punishment centers (i.e., in the amygdala and insula) has been suggested to mediate the aversiveness of delay in ADHD individuals (Sonuga-Barke, 2003 . Indeed, signals of upcoming imposed delay elicit increased hemodynamic responses in these brain regions in patients with ADHD (Lemiere et al., 2012; Wilbertz et al., 2013) .
The Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT) is a standardized, wellcharacterized approach to assessing decision making under uncertainty Deakin et al., 2004; Rogers et al., 1999) , in which probabilities of different outcomes are presented explicitly. Crucially for the current analysis, it was designed in a way that makes it possible to disentangle the different components (risk proness, reflection impulsivity, and delay aversion) that may account for suboptimal DMR in ADHD by including these components as process scores. First, risk adjustment is defined as the ability to modify choices in the light of information about the probability of different outcomes, and hence track the optimal outcome on each trial (see Figure 1) . Second, risk proneness is the total number of points that are gambled on the most improbable outcome-reflecting the overall tendency to take risks. Third, reflection time is the time taken to think about the options during the decision phase, and is calculated on the basis of the deliberation time between stimulus presentation and choice outcome. Finally, delay aversion reflects the proportion of choices made for the option available most immediately irrespective of the outcome. In the CGT, both reflection time and delay aversion are regarded as linked to the concept of impulsivity; however, delay aversion is conceptualized as a motivational driver of impulsivity (delayed rewards; Clark et al., 2008; Deakin et al., 2004) , whereas reflection time is more cognitive in nature perhaps linked to inhibitory control (Deakin et al., 2004) .
Only two studies (Coghill, Seth, & Matthews, 2014; DeVito et al., 2008) have used the CGT to study DMR in boys with ADHD. Coghill et al. (2014) found that the Risk Adjustment score loaded on an overall decision-making factor, which was impaired in the ADHD group. Further, boys with ADHD displayed greater CGT delay aversion. DeVito et al. (2008) likewise reported poorer risk adjustment and greater delay aversion in a drug-stabilized ADHD group. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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The aim of the current study was thus to test the relationship between these four putative processes and suboptimal DMR in drug-naïve children with ADHD. Our hypothesis was that children with ADHD would be less able to effectively adjust their response to risky options in light of information about outcome probabilities (risk adjustment), and, building on the results of previous studies, we predicted that this would be primarily linked to delay aversion. We thus expected that children with ADHD would score lower on risk adjustment and higher on delay aversion. Further, we expected that delay aversion would predict the outcome of risk adjustment when taking into account risk proneness and reflection time. We also expected that the effect of ADHD on delay aversion would be neuropsychological specific, in that the effect on delay aversion would not be explained by inhibitory control or working memory deficits. Furthermore, they would be clinically significant and not explained by the presence of comorbid disorders. Delay aversion is a motivational deficit that is suggested to be different from cognitive impulsivity (i.e., inhibitory control; Deakin et al., 2004; Marco et al., 2009; Sonuga-Barke, 2003) . This assumption also applies to the relation of delay aversion and working memory; however, a recent study (Patros et al., 2015) identified problems with working memory as a possible mediator of choice impulsedelay aversion-in ADHD. It is also possible that comorbid disorders characterized by motivational symptoms, such as oppositional defiant disorder (ODD) or anxiety, may explain the effect of delay aversion in ADHD. Previous studies have shown these symptom constellations to affect DMR in ADHD (Garon et al., 2006; Hobson et al., 2011) .
The current study extends the two previous studies in a number of ways. First, it is the first study to examine the interrelationship between the constituent elements of impaired DMR in ADHDincluding the process scores of risk proneness, reflection time, and delay aversion, and the DMR outcome score of risk adjustment. Second, we tested a mixed gender sample of drug-naïve patients, In (a), the 10 red or blue boxes hiding the yellow token are presented at the top of the screen (in this figure, the first eight boxes are red and the last two are blue). The children push either the square indicating red or blue at the bottom of the screen to guess which colored box the token is hidden behind. Thereafter, the children make a bet by touching the number presented in the box at the right-hand side, numbers representing percentages of the points displayed at the left-hand side that are presented either in ascending or descending sequences. DMR ϭ decision making in the face of risks. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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whereas the two previous studies only included boys with ADHD, either drug-naïve (Coghill et al., 2014) or drug-stabilized (DeVito et al., 2008) . Third, we were able to examine how different neuropsychological processes such as working memory and inhibitory control measures on other tasks were related to those outcomes. Coghill et al. (2014) included a broad set of tasks, whereas DeVito et al. (2008) did not. This is important because Coghill et al. (2014) showed that CGT delay aversion also loaded on inhibitory control, whereas delay aversion measured with the choice delay task has previously been linked to working memory problems in ADHD (Patros et al., 2015) . Fourth, we investigated the influence of comorbid disorders in ADHD on the CGT scores. Based on the findings from Coghill et al. (2014) , in which the presence of comorbid disorders in the ADHD group did not have an effect on the CGT scores, we expected case control differences on the CGT scores would be specific to ADHD and not driven by comorbidity.
Method Participants
Two groups of children (n ϭ 70) performed the CGT: 36 were drug-naïve children with an ADHD diagnosis and 34 were typically developing children. The age of the children ranged from 8 to 12 years of age (mean age ϭ 10.10; SD ϭ 1.18), and the two groups did not differ significantly in age or gender distribution (62% boys in the total sample; see Table 1 ). The local Regional Ethic Committee approved the study, and parents of the children gave informed consent. Exclusion criteria were use of psychostimulants, a Full-Scale Intelligent Quotient Ͻ80, prior head injury, suspicion of an autism spectrum disorder, prior epileptic attacks, or being born before 36 weeks gestation. Patients without a prior ADHD diagnosis but who had symptoms of ADHD were referred to the child and adolescent psychiatric outpatient clinics of the municipality of Bergen and seen by members of the team. Typically developing children were recruited from schools in regions with a geographical overlap with the referral clinics. The children were carefully diagnosed using the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia for School-Age Children-Present and Lifetime Version (K-SADS; Ambrosini, 2000; Kaufman et al., 1997) 
com).
The participants were instructed that a yellow token was hidden behind either a blue box or red box, presented in an array of 10 boxes at the top of a computer screen (Figure 1a) . Furthermore, they were instructed to guess which colored box the token was behind and to indicate their choice by pushing either a red or a blue square at the bottom of the screen. Thereafter, they were instructed to make a bet on the likelihood of their decision being correct or not. The possible bets were displayed on the right-hand side of the screen in sequence, and the instruction was to touch the image of the box on the screen to place a bet. Points were presented in 5-s increments/ decrements. In four of the test blocks, the bets were presented in an ascending order of 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95% portion of the points that the children would "earn" on each trial (displayed on the left-hand side of the computer screen), and in the other, four in a descending order (95%, 75%, 50%, 25%, and 5% portion of the points). The order of presentation (ascending or descending) was counterbalanced across individuals within the groups.
The task was performed on a desktop PC, and the responses were recorded via a touch-sensitive screen. The CGT comprises four practice trials and eight test blocks (including nine trials) with the red:blue box ratio varying from 1:9 to 9:1, in a pseudorandom order, and with the total points reset to 100 points at the start of each block. In the current study, the CGT generated scores for the four key CGT variables-risk adjustment, risk proneness, reflec- This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
tion time, and delay aversion were calculated (Figure 1b) . Risk adjustment was designated the outcome, and risk proneness, reflection time, and delay aversion as the process variables. These scores were centralized as z scores (see Table 1 for the CGT raw scores). We also included the test duration time as a variable. Working memory tasks. The letter-number sequencing task from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Fourth Edition (WISC-IV; Wechsler, 2003 ) and the spatial span task from the WISC-IV integrated battery (Kaplan, Fein, Kramer, Delis, & Morris, 2004 ) were used to assess verbal and visuospatial working memory (Baddeley, 1986) , respectively. The spatial span task consists of two conditions-one forward and one backward. In the forward condition, the children have to recall and touch blocks in the same order as that presented by the examiner. In the backward condition of the spatial span, the children have to recall and touch blocks in the opposite order than presented by the examiner. In performing the letter-number sequencing task, the children have to recall, rearrange, and reproduce a sequence of letters and numbers presented aloud by the examiner. We included the score generated from the performance on the backward condition in the spatial span task as a measure of visuospatial working memory, and the total score from the letter-number sequencing task as a measure of verbal working memory.
Inhibitory control task. The stop signal task from the CANTAB (www.camcog.com; Chamberlain et al., 2011) was included to measure problems with inhibitory control (Aron, Dowson, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003) . The stop signal task is a computer-based task in which the children decide whether a presented arrow on the screen points to the right-or left-hand side, indicated by pressing either a right or left button on a response box (i.e., go trials). In 25% of the trials, a sound is presented, which signals that the children shall inhibit the response on which direction the presented arrows points to. The stop signal reaction time (SSRT) is the score that measures inhibitory control. The SSRT is the time interval between the mean RT on go trials and the stop-signal delay (the time interval from the stimuli "arrow" is presented on the screen until the stop signal is presented). The stop signal delay dynamically adjusts to each child's mean RT on go trials, and this adjustment secures that all the children succeed on at least 50% of the trials when the stop signal is presented.
Intellectual Function-Full-Scale IQ. IQ was assessed using the WISC-IV (Wechsler, 2003) . The mean IQ in the sample was 99.11 (SD ϭ 11.19; range ϭ 82-134).
Diagnostic assessment. The diagnostic assessment of children participating in the study followed the algorithm of the K-SADS (Kaufman et al., 1997) . This is a reliable semistructured interview evaluating current and past episodes of psychopathology in children according to the DSM-IV criteria (Ambrosini, 2000; American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Kaufman et al., 1997) . Clinical professionals interviewed the children and their parents with the K-SADS interview, and a child psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist confirmed the diagnostic evaluation. Only children with a primary diagnosis of ADHD were included (n ϭ 36).
Procedure
The children came with their parents to the testing and evaluation session. One researcher followed the family throughout the assessment and gave information to the children and their parents about the procedure of the assessment. The children and parents then gave written consent to participate in the study. The children were then administered the cognitive assessments, administered by trained test assistants, while the parents were interviewed with the K-SADS. After cognitive testing, children were interviewed with the K-SADS separately. All children received the same battery of tests in a fixed order, which took approximately 3 hr to complete. They were allowed breaks as needed, with one break set in the middle of the testing. The CGT was administered as the last test of the battery, because piloting of the test battery revealed that children seemed to like to perform this test. The ethical approval of the study allowed for the reimbursement of £100 ($122) to the parents and their children, compensating the parents for the time off from work and travel expenses. The children also received small rewards (a T-shirt and a small toy) after they finished the cognitive testing.
Statistical Analyses
Statistical analyses were computed with IBM SPSS, Version 23, and run in four stages. We first tested the hypothesis that children with ADHD would score lower on risk adjustment and higher on delay aversion. We then tested the hypothesis that delay aversion would predict risk adjustment accounting for risk proneness and reflection time. Finally, we tested the hypothesis that the ADHD effect on delay aversion on DMR would not be explained by problems with inhibitory control or working memory. The stepwise approach was implemented with the following procedure: In Stage A, four univariate analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) were run to test for between-groups effects on the CGT scores of risk adjustment, risk proneness, reflection time, and delay aversion. All four models were adjusted for age and gender. In Stage B, to explore whether the group differences found in Stage A were due to intelligence or other neuropsychological deficits, IQ, working memory (letter-number sequencing and backward spatial span), and inhibitory control (SSRT) were added as further covariates into each of the four ANCOVA models (Mayers, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) . In Stage C, a linear hierarchical regression was run to test which of the CGT process scores (risk proneness, reflection time, and delay aversion) predicted the outcome score of risk adjustment, while always adjusting for the covariates of age and gender. In Stage D, in order to explore whether the predictive effect of the process variables on the risk adjustment were due to intelligence or other neuropsychological deficits, the linear hierarchical regression analysis of Stage C was repeated while additionally adjusting for IQ, working memory (letter-number sequencing and backward spatial span), and inhibitory control (SSRT) as covariates. Our hypothesis was that the Delay Aversion score would predict risk adjustment. In Stages C and D, we therefore entered risk proneness and deliberation time into the first step of the hierarchical model, together with the remaining covariates (Stage C: age and gender; Stage D: age, gender, IQ, the Working Memory scores, and Inhibitory Control score), and the Delay Aversion score in the second step. In supplementary analyses, we ran four ANCOVAs to investigate the effect of comorbid disorders in the ADHD group on the CGT scores (risk adjustment, risk proneness, reflection time, and delay aversion) while always adjusting for age and gender. First, we investigated the effect of externalizing comorbid disorders (ODD/CD) on the CGT scores, This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
and second, the effect of internalizing comorbid disorders (anxiety). Further, also as a supplementary analysis, we tested whether the prediction of delay aversion on risk adjustment by delay aversion was specific to those with an ADHD diagnosis by adding an interaction variable between ADHD and delay aversion in the second step of the regression model described under Stage C (main statistical analyses). A significant effect of the interaction variable would suggest that the effect of delay aversion was specific to those with an ADHD diagnosis (Aiken & West, 1991) . We adjusted for multiple analyses by using Bonferroni correction of alpha level in the between-groups analyses (ANCOVAs; p ϭ .05/4), which gives an alpha-corrected p level of .013. Outliers were defined using a Ϯ3 standard deviation threshold from the sample mean and were replaced with a score of Ϯ2 standard deviations from the sample mean (Field, 2005) . Two outliers were detected: One child with ADHD showed a very long reflection time (z ϭ 4.12), and one typically developing child showed a very high score in risk adjustment (z ϭ 3.97).
Results
In the group of children with ADHD, 23 children fulfilled the diagnostic criteria for the combined subtype, 11 had the predominantly inattentive subtype, and two had the hyperactive/impulsive subtype (Leckman, Sholomskas, Thompson, Belanger, & Wessman, 1982) . Further, 23 of the 36 children with ADHD fulfilled the criteria for at least one comorbid disorder. The comorbid disorders present were oppositional defiant disorder (n ϭ 17), conduct disorder (n ϭ 3), phobia disorders (n ϭ 9), and general anxiety disorder (n ϭ 2). One child in the control group fulfilled the diagnostic criteria for specific phobia. On the cognitive measures, the children with ADHD had significantly lower IQ and Working Memory (letter-number sequencing and spatial span) scores than the group of typically developing children, whereas no such significant difference appeared in relation to inhibitory control (SSRT; see Table 1 ).
CGT Delay Aversion and Risk Proneness scores correlated significantly with age: Younger children were more delay averse and less risk prone than the older ones (see online Supplemental Table 1 ). Moreover, boys were more risk prone than girls. Delay aversion correlated with lower IQ, whereas high IQ was associated with better risk adjustment. Reflection time was not significantly associated with age, gender, or IQ. Lower risk adjustment correlated significantly only with delay aversion and delay aversion correlated significantly with lower risk proneness. Reflection time did not correlate with other measures. Delay aversion correlated with a lower test duration time (r ϭ Ϫ.84, p Ͻ .001), whereas greater risk proneness (r ϭ .36, p Ͻ .01), longer reflection time (r ϭ .32, p Ͻ .01), and better risk adjustment (r ϭ .32, p Ͻ .01) correlated with longer test duration.
In Stage A, we tested our hypothesis that children with ADHD would score lower on risk adjustment and higher on delay aversion. This hypothesis was confirmed in that children with ADHD displayed poorer risk adjustment, F(1, 66) ϭ 11.38, p ϭ .001, p 2 ϭ .15, and more delay aversion, F(1, 66) ϭ 8.24, p ϭ .006, p 2 ϭ .11 (see Figure 2) . The groups did not differ with regard to reflection time or risk proneness. Age covaried with delay aversion, F(1, 66) ϭ 10.69, p ϭ .002, p 2 ϭ .14, and risk proneness, F(1, 66) ϭ 4.82, p ϭ .03, p 2 ϭ .07, whereas adding gender as a covariate did not affect the results. In Stage B, we investigated the hypothesis that the ADHD effect on risk adjustment and delay aversion would not be better explained by other cognitive factors. IQ, Working Memory scores (spatial span backward and letternumber sequencing), and the Inhibitory Control score (SSRT) did not covary with the CGT scores and were therefore excluded from the model.
In the linear hierarchical regression analysis of Stage C, we tested the hypothesis that delay aversion would predict risk adjust- Figure 2 . The estimated marginal means from the between-groups analyses on the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT) scores of risk proneness, reflection time, delay aversion, and risk adjustment. The means were adjusted for the effects of age and sex in the between-groups analyses. To adjust for multiple analyses, a Bonferroni correction of the alpha level is applied; ␣ level of 0.05/4 univariate analyses ϭ 0.013. The error bars represent the standard errors. ADHD ϭ attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder.
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ment when taking into account risk proneness and reflection time. This hypothesis was confirmed, in that entering delay aversion in the second step of the model explained 19% of additional variance of the Risk Adjustment score (see Table 2 ) compared with the first step including risk proneness and reflection time, age, and gender as predictors. Delay aversion and risk proneness significantly predicted risk adjustment in the second step of the model. In Stage D, we checked whether the effect of delay aversion on risk adjustment as an outcome could not be better explained by other cognitive factors. As such, adding IQ, working memory (letternumber sequencing and backward spatial span), and inhibitory control (SSRT) as covariates to the model did not contribute significantly to explaining the variance in risk adjustment and were excluded from the model. We additionally tested the influence of comorbid disorders on the effects of ADHD on risk adjustment and delay aversion. ANCOVAs revealed no significant differences on the CGT scores between ADHD with comorbid externalizing disorders (ODD/CD; n ϭ 17) and without such comorbidity (n ϭ 19), or those with comorbid internalizing disorders (anxiety; n ϭ 11) and those without such comorbidity (n ϭ 25; see online Supplemental Table  2) . Further, we also tested whether the relationship between delay aversion and risk adjustment was specific to ADHD by adding a term of the delay aversion and ADHD interaction in the regression model described in Stage C. This term was not significant, indicating that the effect of delay aversion on risk adjustment was not limited to the ADHD group (see online supplemental Table 3 ).
Discussion
The aim of the current study was to use the CGT to tease apart the distinctive processes underpinning suboptimal DMR in children with ADHD. Our findings suggest that the children with ADHD were not unusually risk prone when performing the CGT; however, consistent with previous results, children with ADHD had problems adjusting their choices to the changing information available about the probabilities of winning. The results suggest that these problems with risk adjustment were specifically linked to delay aversion. Further, poorer risk adjustment and delay adverse behavior seemed to be specifically linked to the ADHD diagnosis and not to comorbid disorders in this group. This is the first study showing an interrelationship between factors in DMR in children with ADHD, and that aversiveness toward delay seems to be the most substantial contribution to suboptimal DMR (as indexed by Risk Adjustment) in these children (see Figure 3) .
First, there was no evidence that, overall, children with ADHD were risk prone-or favored the risky option in general for its own sake. Contrary to what is often assumed and presented in the literature, these findings imply that the association between ADHD and risk-prone behaviors may not be caused by an intrinsic valuation of risk proneness in itself. The ability of the CGT to distinguish between different elements of the DMR process provide crucial evidence to move the field away from the assumption that ADHD children are inherent risk takers-with three studies, including the current one, refuting the notion (Coghill et al., 2014; DeVito et al., 2008) .
Second, although not risk seekers, children with ADHD did have difficulties adapting their choices to the changing patterns of outcome probabilities programmed during the task-a finding also consistent with the two previous CGT studies on ADHD (Coghill et al., 2014; DeVito et al., 2008) . We found evidence that this was reflected by children with ADHD to show delay aversion as defined in the CGT: They tended to choose the least delayed option of the two available, independent of the level of associated risk. This finding was predicted and in line with the two previous studies (Coghill et al., 2014; DeVito et al., 2008) . However, we found that delay aversion predominantly predicted the Risk Adjustment score compared with being risk prone or using less reflection time, which is a novel finding, as the two previous studies in ADHD (Coghill et al., 2014; DeVito et al., 2008) did not study the relationship between delay aversion and risk adjustment. This may suggest that the failure to adjust choice to optimize outcomes was linked to a different motivational style rather than to a cognitive deficit. The finding of increased delay aversion is consistent with a large body of literature showing that decisionmaking processing in children with ADHD is affected by a preference for immediate reward to escape delay (Marco et al., 2009; Paloyelis et al., 2010; Solanto et al., 2001 ). Similar to Coghill et al. (2014) , we found that this increased delay aversion and the problems with adjusting risks was specific to the ADHD diagnosis and not to the presence of comorbid disorders in this group of children.
The concept of delay aversion, however, has been operationalized somewhat differently in different studies. In recent conceptualizations, delay aversion is distinguished from other possible causes, such as inhibitory problems, in a number of different ways-in particular, by being explicitly linked to the escape of This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
delay rather than an impulsive drive for immediate reward (Sonuga-Barke, 2003) . Children with ADHD tend to choose immediate rewards more consistently when this choice gives escape from delay compared with when the same choice does not follow by an escape of delay (Marco et al., 2009; Sonuga-Barke, Taylor, Sembi, & Smith, 1992) . Delay aversion is therefore hypothesized to be a dynamic trait in children with ADHD that is highly context dependent (Sonuga-Barke, 2005) . In contrast, problems with inhibitory control comprise impulsivity that may be associated with a preference for immediate reward (Barkley, Edwards, Laneri, Fletcher, & Metevia, 2001 ) independent of contextual factors (i.e., the possibility to escape delay; Barkley, 1997) . It is important to note that the CGT Delay Aversion score does not distinguish the drive for immediate reward from the need to escape delay (Deakin et al., 2004; Rogers et al., 1999) , and appears to load both on the factors of Delay Aversion and on Inhibitory Control (Coghill et al., 2014) . We thus confirmed that delay aversion was associated with a shorter duration of test time, and this association showed a large effect, which means that a predominant tendency to choose to bet on the immediate points led to an earlier "escape" from this specific test setting. Further, the children's degree of inhibitory control did not associate with delay aversion in the betweengroups analysis. In addition, the children with ADHD did not use less reflection time before making their choices-a pattern linked to inhibitory problems, such as previously shown on the decisionmaking task of Tower of London (Solanto et al., 2007; Young et al., 2007) . Moreover, other aspects of cognitive functioning, such as working memory and the children's level of IQ, also did not associate with delay aversion in the between-groups analyses. These findings strengthen the claim that the delay aversion measure as operationalized in the CGT was the main contributor to the poorer risk adjustment in children with ADHD in the current study, and that it is not related to a more general tendency to reflect on problems (Deakin et al., 2004; DeVito et al., 2008) , working memory problems, or a lower IQ. We have suggested a model of DMR (see Figure 3 ) that links our finding of delay aversion to cause problems with risk adjustment in children with ADHD, and not risk proneness, as previously suggested (Groen et al., 2013) . Our findings suggest, however, that despite children with ADHD being significantly more delay aversive than typically developing children, the effect of delay aversion on the risk adjustment outcome is not specific to ADHD. This means that delay aversion may also explain poorer risk adjustment-that is, DMR-in typically developing children. Third, the problems with adjusting risk taking in ADHD may relate to other factors than the three suggested in our study: delay aversion, risk proneness, and reflection impulsivity. Problems with DMR in ADHD may reflect a general inattention to changes in the environment that leads to these being ignored (Barkley, 1997) . It could also be linked to a more general insensitivity to changes in reinforcement schedules that have been previously observed in ADHD (Kollins, Newland, & Critchfield, 1997) . And lastly, it could be related to problems comparing multiple outcomes of different value at the same time (Sonuga-Barke & Fairchild, 2012) . Future studies of DMR in ADHD could test the model depicted in Figure 3 against other possible causal factors of DMR.
Conclusion
The performance of children with ADHD could be differentiated from that of typically developing children in terms of their ability to adjust responses to optimize outcomes in the face of changing probabilities and their level of delay aversion, with these two effects being correlated. Children with ADHD were, however, not risk takers in a general sense. Thus, motivational factors such as delay aversion may be important in understanding why individuals with ADHD have impaired DMR. A descriptive model describing the relationship between attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and suboptimal decision making in the face of risk (DMR). The findings from the current study indicate that delay aversion, and not risk proneness, is the predominant cause for children with ADHD to engage in impulsive decisions. This was evidenced by a significant effect of ADHD diagnosis on delay aversion and risk adjustment; effects not otherwise explained by age, gender, or other neuropsychological deficits of IQ, working memory, or inhibitory control. Further, delay aversion predicted the outcome of risk adjustment when taking into account risk proneness and reflection impulsivity (not specific to children with ADHD). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
